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I. INTRODUCTION
Sexting is the modern term given to “the practice of sending or posting 
sexually suggestive text messages and images, including nude or semi-
nude photographs, via cellular telephones or over the Internet.”1 Since 
2009, teenage sexting has been featured in the news repeatedly.  Most
prominent of these articles are those reporting that teenagers—both high 
school and middle school students—are being arrested for child
pornography-related charges because those teens have traded or passed
on images of either themselves or a peer of a similar age.  Most media
reports have described these situations with outrage,2 and that is
understandable because the so-called victim of child pornography is 
being treated as the perpetrator.3  Despite the fact that child pornography 
laws are designed to protect minors, these teens can be convicted of 
felonies and even forced to register as child pornographers for transmitting 
their own image to another teen.  Some have suggested a “Romeo and 
Juliet” exception to child pornography laws that would protect teenagers 
who consensually transmit images of themselves to each other.4  This  
exception is used in many states for statutory rape offenses.
State legislators have responded to teen sexting in different ways.  As 
of 2010, at least sixteen states have introduced or are considering bills or
resolutions aimed at sexting.5  Some states have amended their child 
1. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
2. See, e.g., Nancy McKenna, ‘Sexting’—Navigating Through Muddy Waters, 
COMPUTER CRIME & TECH. L. ENFORCEMENT, May 2010, at 1, 1–3; Robert H. Wood, The
Failure of Sexting Criminalization: A Plea for the Exercise of Prosecutorial Restraint, 
16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 151, 176 (2009); Shannon Shafron-Perez, Comment, 
Average Teenager or Sex Offender? Solutions to the Legal Dilemma Caused by Sexting, 
26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 431, 452 (2009). But see Mary Graw Leary,
Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal Response to Juvenile Self-
Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 45–48 (2007) (arguing that sexting 
teens should be required to register as sex offenders). 
3. According to one commentator, “[i]t is a venerable common law principle that
the class of persons a statute is meant to protect should not be subject to punishment
under the statute.”  Wood, supra note 2, at 171.  Unlike “victimless crimes” that are not 
intended to protect a certain class of persons, child pornography laws were drafted to 
protect children from adults, not from themselves.
 4. Catherine Arcabascio, Sexting and Teenagers: OMG R U Going 2 Jail???, 16 
RICH. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2010, at 1, 35, http://jolt.richmond.edu/v16i3/article10.pdf;
see also W. Jesse Weins & Todd C. Hiestand, Sexting, Statutes, and Saved by the Bell: 
Introducing a Lesser Juvenile Charge with an “Aggravating Factors” Framework, 77
TENN. L. REV. 1, 48–54 (2009) (creating model statutory language). 
5. See 2010 Legislation Related to “Sexting,” NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19696 (last updated Jan. 4, 2011).
There is currently no federal sexting legislation; however, Colorado, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Utah, and Vermont have already passed sexting legislation. Id.; 2011 “Sexting”
Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.
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pornography statutes to create sexting exceptions, and others have
created additional misdemeanor offenses that prosecutors can use for 
minors that will keep them in juvenile court and off the sex offender 
registry.6  For example, Vermont has added a statute that states that a 
minor who uses “a computer or electronic communication device to
transmit an indecent visual depiction of himself or herself to another 
person” will be tried as a juvenile and will not face the possibility of 
being required to register as a sex offender.7  The Utah Criminal Code 
now gives felony convictions only to people aged eighteen years and 
over for sexting-related offenses; teens aged seventeen years and younger 
can receive a misdemeanor at most.8  Most recently, Arizona has enacted 
a statute that establishes as Class 2 misdemeanors the offenses of
juveniles’ using an electronic communication device to possess or 
transmit images of minors that depict explicit sexual material.9  The  
statute also provides defenses to minors who receive such images but did 
not solicit them and who make a good faith effort to destroy them.10 
These statutory attempts have been lauded as a good start, but none
appears to wholly address the problem of age of consent inconsistencies.11 
There have been multiple cases in which the parties prosecuted for 
sexting could legally be sexually active with each other.12  Under federal
aspx?tabid=22127 (last updated June 22, 2011); 2009 “Sexting” Legislation, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17756 (last 
revised Sept. 1, 2010). 
6. See Amber Ellis, Bill Would Clarify ‘Sexting’ Law, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, 
Apr. 14, 2009, at B2, available at 2009 WLNR 16840705; Brett Kelman, ‘Sexting’ a 
Serious Offense, PAC. DAILY NEWS (Guam), May 10, 2010, at A1, available at 2010
WLNR 9656017; McKenna, supra note 2, at 3.
 7. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b(a)–(b)(2) (2009).  Schools have also taken it
upon themselves to adopt policies and strategies for dealing with their sexting students. 
Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When Children 
Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 1, 63–64 (2009). 
 8. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1204(4)(a)–(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
 9. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309 (Supp. 2010). 
10. Id.
11. See Weins & Hiestand, supra note 4, at 34–48. 
12. See, e.g., Jeremy Pawloski, Teens’ ‘Sexting’ Charges Likely Will Be Dismissed, 
OLYMPIAN, Feb. 18, 2010, http://www.theolympian.com/2010/02/18/1142122/teens-sexting- 
charges-likely-will.html (discussing two thirteen-year-old girls and a fourteen-year-old
boy who sent pictures of a fourteen-year-old girl); Jared Taylor, Questions Arise in La 
Joya Schools ‘Sexting’ Case, MONITOR, May 5, 2010, http://www.themonitor.com/ 
articles/palmview-38189-school-charge.html (discussing a seventeen-year-old boy with a 
photo of a sixteen-year-old girl). 
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and most state law, the child pornography age is under eighteen13 even 
though thirty-nine states have an age of consent of seventeen years or 
younger.14  When Romeo and Juliet exceptions to statutory rape law are 
examined, almost every state allows sexual relations between young 
people and teens who are close in age.  Additionally, in some federal
statutes, the age of consent is sixteen.15 This disparity indicates a
disconnect between legislators’ beliefs in the sexual maturity of teens:
they should be allowed to have sexual relationships with their peers 
without fear of prosecution, but these same teens cannot take photos of 
these exploits or share them with each other.16 Moreover, another
inconsistency exists because teens are charged with child pornography
offenses due to their status as minors but are then prosecuted in adult
criminal court and threatened with adult sentences.17 
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2252 (2006 & Supp. III 2010); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 311.3 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100
(2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-4 (West 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.05 (West
2010). 
 14. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (age 16); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.436 (2008) (age 16); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-127(a)(1)(A)(i) (2010) (age 16);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(e) (2010) (age 17); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
71(a)(1) (West 1958) (age 16); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(a) (2007) (age 16); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 707-730(1)(c) (Supp. 2007) (age 16); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-15(b)–(c) 
(West 1993) (age 17); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-9(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (age 
16); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2)(c)(4) (West 2003) (age 16); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3503(a) (2007) (age 16); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.120(1)(b) (LEXIS through 2010 
Extraordinary Sess.) (age 16); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:80(A)(1) (2004 & Supp. 2009)
(age 17); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254(1)(A) (2006) (age 16); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-307(a)(3)–(5) (LEXIS through 2010 Reg. Sess.) (age 16); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 23A (West 2008) (age 16); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520b(1)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (age 16); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.345(1)(b)
(West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (age 16); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95(1)(c) (West, Westlaw 
through 2010 Reg. Sess.) (age 16); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.034(1) (West 1999) (age 17);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(3) (2009) (age 16); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319.01(1)(c)
(Supp. 2010) (age 16); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.364(5)(a)–(b) (2009) (age 16); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3(II) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010) (age 16); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:14-2(a)(2) (West 2005) (age 16); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(G)(1) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2010) (age 17); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25(2) (McKinney 2009) (age 17); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7A (2009) (age 16); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04(A) (West
2006) (age 16); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (age 
16); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (West 2000) (age 16); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-6 
(2002) (age 16); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(B)(2) (Supp. 2010) (age 16); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-22-7 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (age 16); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(c)(1) 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (age 17); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c) (2009) (age 16);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.079(1) (West 2009) (age 16); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-
8B-5(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (age 16); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-316(a)(iv) (2009) (age 
16). 
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006). 
16. See Amy F. Kimpel, Using Laws Designed To Protect as a Weapon: 
Prosecuting Minors Under Child Pornography Laws, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
299, 301 (2010). 
17. Id. at 302. 
954
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These disparities have raised several constitutional law claims at the 
state and federal level.  Although the Court has not yet ruled upon First 
Amendment claims of sexting, defendants have argued that prosecuting 
teens who are over the age of consent under child pornography laws 
violates these teens’ rights under equal protection, freedom of privacy,
and due process.18  In only one of these cases has the defendant been
successful with a due process claim.19  The vast majority of these cases
involved adults who recorded their sexual encounters with minors under 
the age of eighteen.  However, one case in Florida involved sexting
between teens, and the defendant teen’s privacy rights claim was
rejected.20  The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue and lower
courts have given inconsistent rulings.  The law in this area is therefore 
still undecided.
This Article will focus primarily on sexting cases and scenarios that 
involve the transmission of nude or sexually explicit photographs 
between teens who are both above the age of consent or who would be
exempt from prosecution if they had sexual intercourse due to the 
relevant state’s Romeo and Juliet exception to its statutory rape statute.21 
Part II will look at real-life examples of sexting prosecutions to see how 
the juveniles in question would have fared if they had simply engaged in 
sexual intercourse.  In Part III, this Article will compare sexting
prosecutions with the rationale behind statutory rape laws and their
corresponding Romeo and Juliet exceptions.  Part IV will analyze the 
probability of success of four potential constitutional challenges to 
sexting prosecutions: freedom of expression, equal protection, right to 
privacy, and due process.  In Part V, this Article will propose a Romeo 
and Juliet exception to sexting that emphasizes consent. 
18. Id. at 331.  In a related matter, the Third Circuit upheld a § 1983 action against 
a Wyoming county district attorney, alleging the attorney’s threat of potential charges
against teenage girls for sending sexually suggestive text messages was retaliatory in
violation of their First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.  See Miller v.
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2010).  The district attorney had threatened 
prosecution unless the teens went to an education and counseling program that required 
them to write an essay as to why their sexting behavior was wrong. Id. at 144. 
19. See Salter v. State, 906 N.E.2d 212, 221–23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
20. A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
21. This Article will not consider text messages without attached images because 
these kinds of texts are not being prosecuted under child pornography statutes and are 
more likely to be protected under the First Amendment.  See John A. Humbach, 
‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433, 455 (2010).
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II. EXAMPLES OF SEXTING PROSECUTIONS
Sexting prosecutions and the media response beg the question as to
whether and why sexting is a serious issue.  Despite widespread media
attention and parental outrage, experts say that sexting is normal teenage 
behavior.22  Teens are simply using technology to fuel their natural and
hormone-driven curiosity.23  However, teens have also been shown to
have poorer impulse control and risk assessment abilities, which means 
that they may post or send images without thinking of the legal and
social consequences.24 
Some argue that sexting is not that common and therefore is not 
worthy of so much attention from legislators and the media.25  One study
that the media has used repeatedly shows that, in a 2008 survey, 22% of 
girls and 18% of boys said that they had sexted.26  However, that study 
has been criticized for having skewed results because it was a voluntary 
survey and the subjects were not randomly selected.27  Another more 
reliable survey from the Pew Research Center’s American Life Project
showed that only 4% of twelve- to seventeen-year-olds surveyed had 
sent images and 15% had received images.28  For seventeen-year-olds,
those numbers increased to 8% sending pictures and 30% receiving them, 
indicating that as teens age, they are more likely to send and receive
sexting photos.29  The Pew study is more methodologically reliable because
it consists of a random national sample, but the researchers have
 22. Ellee Kladzyk, ‘Sexting’—What’s the Big Deal, Kids Wonder, WASHTENAW
VOICE, May 11, 2009, http://voice.kellekinser.com/15/17/sexting.html; Peter E. Cumming, 
Address to the Roundtable on Youth, Sexuality, Technology at the Congress of the
Humanities and Social Sciences: Children’s Rights, Voices, Technology, Sexuality (May
26, 2009), available at http://www.yorku.ca/cummingp/documents/TeenSextingbyPeter 
CummingMay262009.pdf. 
23. See Calvert, supra note 7, at 20; Brent Dean, Sexting: Is It Really Hurting 
Teens?, COMPUTER CRIME & TECH. L. ENFORCEMENT, May 2010, at 1, 2; Cumming,
supra note 22, at 8. 
 24. Arcabascio, supra note 4, at 7; Brett Buckner, Boundless Consequences: With 
‘Sexting,’ a Seemingly Innocent Decision Can Lead to a Lifetime of Regret, ANNISTON
STAR, July 5, 2009, http://www.annistonstar.com/view/full_story/2886683/article-Boundless-
consequences--With--sexting--a-seemingly-innocent-decision-can-lead-to-a-lifetime-of-
regret; Claudia Feldman, Message Is Out on Sexting, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 2, 2009, at 1, 
available at 2009 WLNR 6517995. 
25. See Sociologist: Few Teens ‘Sexting,’  UNITED PRESS INT’L, Jan. 11, 2009, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/01/11/Sociologist-Few-teens-sexting/UPI-7814123 
1654189/; Cumming, supra note 22, at 6. 
26. Addressing Sexting, CONN. L. TRIB., June 8, 2009, http://www.ctlawtribune. 
com/printarticle.aspx?ID=34004. 
 27. Calvert, supra note 7, at 21 (citing Carl Bialik, Which Is Epidemic—Sexting or 
Worrying About It?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2009, at A9). 
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acknowledged that their sample may have underreported sexting behavior
due to fear of social disapproval.30  Indeed, some commentators have
stated that sexting is far more prevalent than most people realize.31 
The cases that have been reported in the media provide a clear picture 
of how teens are being prosecuted.  In the news, there have been several
examples of teenagers who have been charged with or prosecuted for 
child pornography even though they could not have been charged under 
their state’s statutory rape law.  In Texas, a seventeen-year-old boy was
caught with a naked picture of a sixteen-year-old girl on his phone.32 
The girl reported to the school principal that she sent the naked picture 
to him because he threatened to pass around a topless photo she had
previously sent.33  Photos of at least five other girls were found on his
phone.34 Although the age of consent in Texas is seventeen, Texas’s
Romeo and Juliet exception to its statutory rape law would have protected
the boy if the couple had engaged in sex instead of trading photographs 
because he was less than three years older than the girl.35  However, 
under current child pornography laws, the boy may face child pornography
charges as if he were an adult.36 
Other states have shown similar results.37  Two Illinois middle school
students were charged with child pornography for sending naked 
pictures of themselves to each other.38  In New York, a sixteen-year-old 
boy may face seven years in jail after forwarding naked pictures of his 
fifteen-year-old girlfriend to classmates.39  In Ohio, a thirteen-year-old
boy was arrested on a felony charge after school officials found an 
30. See id. at 4 & n.10. 
 31. Buckner, supra note 24; Kladzyk, supra note 22. 
 32. Taylor, supra note 12. 
33. Id.
34. Id.
 35. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(e)(2)(A) (West 2011). 
 36. Taylor, supra note 12.  As of August 21, 2010, the boy has not been indicted, 
but it is possible that he may still be indicted in the future.
37. Due to anonymity concerns, most of these cases have been reported with little 
identifying detail, making it difficult to determine whether the teens in question have 
actually faced indictment or trial.  The Author continues to follow up with these stories 
and uses case records when possible; however, the dearth of reported cases, despite the 
relatively large number of reported arrests, indicates that many of these cases may be
disposed of without a formal indictment. 
 38. Kristen Schorsch, Sexting May Spell Court for Children, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 
2010, at C17.
 39. Buckner, supra note 24.  There has apparently been no further movement on
this case since it was first reported.
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image of an eighth-grade girl engaging in sexual activity on his phone.40 
As in Texas, the states of Indiana, New York, and Ohio have Romeo and
Juliet exceptions to their statutory rape laws, which would have spared
these teens prosecution if they had engaged in sexual activity instead of 
sexting.41  Similarly, in Washington, prosecutors offered to drop criminal 
charges against three thirteen- and fourteen-year-old middle school students
who sexted if they attended a diversion program.42  Washington’s statutory 
rape laws would have given the teenagers a defense to prosecution if they
had been engaged in sexual activity without photographing it.43 
Two of the most controversial cases have come out of Florida.  The 
first involves “A.H.,” a sixteen-year-old girl, and her seventeen-year-old 
boyfriend who were charged with producing, directing, or promoting 
child pornography in Florida because they took photos of themselves
engaging in sexual activity.44  The teens e-mailed the photos to another
computer but did not share the images with anyone.45  One of the teens
pleaded nolo contendere and was given probation but appealed the 
conviction as violating her right to privacy.46  Her appeal failed, and the
Florida Supreme Court declined her petition for review.47  Also in Florida is
the famous case of Phillip Alpert who, when he was eighteen years old,
was convicted on child pornography charges for forwarding a picture of 
his sixteen-year-old ex-girlfriend to her e-mail contacts.48  As a result of 
his conviction, Alpert was placed on probation but also had to register as 
a sex offender, was expelled from college, and has been unable to find
work.49  Even odder, Alpert is not permitted to live with his father 
because his father’s house is too close to a school, the very high school 
Alpert attended even after he was convicted.50  Both A.H. and Alpert 
would have been immune from statutory rape prosecution for actually
engaging in sexual activity.  Although Florida’s age of consent is eighteen,
 40. Ellis, supra note 6. 
 41. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-9(e)(2) (West Supp. 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 130.25(3) (McKinney 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04(B)(2) (West 2006). 
 42. Pawloski, supra note 12. 
 43. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.030(3)(a) (West 2009). This case is
distinguishable from the other cases mentioned because the fourteen-year-old boy sent a 
picture of a fourteen-year-old girl to a thirteen-year-old girl, who then sent it to another 
thirteen-year-old girl without the fourteen-year-old girl’s consent.  Pawloski, supra note 
12. 
44. A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 234, cert. denied, 959 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2007).  The court’s reasoning will 
be discussed more fully below. 
48. Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside
the Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2009). 
49. Id. at 6, 21–22. 
50. Id. at 21. 
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its Romeo and Juliet law decriminalizes sexual activity between a minor 
aged sixteen or older and an adult aged twenty-three or younger.51 
The facts of these cases show the lack of fit between sexting and child
pornography, especially because sexting teens almost invariably would 
have been protected from statutory rape charges.  Statutory rape and 
child pornography legislation have many similarities, particularly in
their shared goal of protecting children from sexual exploitation.
Statutory rape laws have already adapted to increased teenage sexuality
and therefore provide a blueprint for how child pornography laws can
similarly adapt. 
III. COMPARISON WITH STATUTORY RAPE LAWS
Statutory rape laws have a long history in American jurisprudence. 
They were imported from the English common law and have evolved 
steadily over time.52  Originally, the age of consent was ten years old, 
but states gradually raised it to as high as eighteen or twenty-one.53 
Early statutory rape laws were clearly concerned with protecting
young girls; all laws criminalized sex only with young females, and 
many contained harsher penalties if the male was an adult but lesser
penalties if he was younger than the girl.54  Today, most states have 
gender-neutral statutory rape laws, and almost all states have added 
Romeo and Juliet exceptions for sex between two young people who are 
similar in age.  Statutory rape laws are rarely enforced, with some
evidence that prosecutors and judges prefer cases where the victim is
perceived as a “chaste” female even though consent is not relevant to the 
offense.55 
Like statutory rape, sexting involves sexual activity between two 
minors, and that has been made illegal.  Both statutory rape and child 
pornography statutes prohibit sexual contact with minors in order to 
protect them from unscrupulous adults who may abuse them.56  Also,  
 51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05(1) (West 2007). 
 52. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory 
Rape Law, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 109, 119–22 (2004). 
53. Id. at 119; Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights 
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 403–04 (1984). 
 54. Oberman, supra note 52, at 119–20. 
55. Id. at 132–39. 
56. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (recognizing that the 
purpose of child pornography statutes is to prevent child exploitation and abuse); Victoria 
Snyder, Romeo and Romeo: Coming Out from Under the Umbrella of Sexual Abuse, 8 
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when enforcing both statutes, prosecutors have had to repeatedly
confront the situation in which minors themselves are committing the
illegal act.  As one commentator has noted, with regard to statutory rape,
“[s]ociety has had to address the situation of two minors engaging in 
sexual intercourse with one another and whether, because both are
committing statutory rape, it is appropriate to charge one, (or both) with 
that crime.”57  For that reason, even before Romeo and Juliet exceptions 
mitigated the impact of statutory rape laws on teens, courts were
interpreting these laws to ameliorate their negative effects on sexually 
active teens.58 
Sexting and statutory rape are also similar because school officials or 
parents usually report the sexting to the police.59  As with statutory rape, 
the sexting teens involved rarely report themselves.  Accordingly, both 
sexting and statutory rape between minors raise issues of harm and
victimization.  It is unclear whether there is any actual harm in teens’
engaging in this activity, and if there is harm, it is arguably not the kind
legislators envisioned when drafting the relevant child pornography
statutes.60  For example, the federal child pornography statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251, was enacted in 1978.61  At this time, sexting was not even
technologically feasible, so legislators could not have anticipated the
trend.  Moreover, the legislative history of § 2251 indicates that Congress
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 237, 246 (2009) (“Historically statutory rape laws
have been intended to protect girls from adult men.”). 
 57. Leary, supra note 2, at 32. 
58. See, e.g., B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 260 (Fla. 1995) (holding that the state 
failed to demonstrate the compelling interest to justify an application of the statutory
rape statute to two teens, and noting that the statute was “not being utilized as a shield to
protect a minor, but rather . . . as a weapon to adjudicate a minor delinquent”); State ex
rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 1206, 1211 (refusing to apply a child sex abuse 
statute to a twelve- and thirteen-year-old couple engaged in consensual sexual 
intercourse because doing so would produce an absurd result that “the legislature could
not possibly have intended”); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 308 (Vt. 2000) (narrowing the 
reach of a broadly worded statutory rape statute so that it did not affect a teen couple in 
order to make the statute consistent with other statutes and to avoid serious questions of 
constitutionality).
59. See, e.g., Wendy Koch, More Teens Caught Up in ‘Sexting,’ USA TODAY, 
Mar. 12, 2009, at 1A, available at 2009 WLNR 4679528; Jeffrey Simmons, Another 
‘Sexting’ Investigation Under Way, WYTHEVILLE ENTERPRISE, June 8, 2010, http://www.
swvatoday.com/news/article/another_sexting_investigation_under_way/7643/. 
60. Some sexting cases do not involve nonconsensual sharing of images; teens 
often send or post images in response to requests or spontaneously and are still subject to 
child pornography prosecutions.  As discussed below, even cases that do involve 
nonconsensual transmission are dissimilar from traditional child pornography cases 
because of the intent of the sender and the reaction of the recipient.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006). 
960
SWEENY POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2011 1:57 PM        
 
    
 













   
 
 











[VOL. 48:  951, 2011] Sexting Prosecutions 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
enacted § 2251 specifically to prevent child abuse and abduction by
adults.62 
Despite these similarities, unlike the trend in statutory rape cases,
penalties for sexting appear to be getting worse.  Although almost every
state has enacted legislation to decriminalize sexual activity between
consenting teenagers, even states that have created such legislation are
still, almost invariably, maintaining (lesser) criminal penalties for sexting.63 
Even those states that have acknowledged that sexting teens should not
be prosecuted under child pornography laws still treat sexting as 
criminal and punish it in some way.64  This disparity is confusing on its 
face: why are legislators willing to allow teens to engage in sexual activity 
but not to record it? 
The most obvious reason for prosecuting sexting teens under child 
pornography laws is that prosecutors are simply enforcing criminal
statutes.  This reason seems disingenuous because the vast majority of 
teens are not sentenced like traditional child pornographers and many are 
never formally indicted.65 Another possible rationale is that legislators 
and prosecutors fear that the images will be used by pedophiles. Certainly, 
there is a greater risk of that than in statutory rape cases.  However, most
images are sent between teens and are never made public or available to 
adults.66  Official statements made by prosecutors indicate that they are
punishing sexting teens to send a message to other adolescents, not 
 62. H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 492
(“The creation and proliferation of child pornography is no less than a national tragedy.
Each year tens of thousands of children under the age of 18 are believed to be filmed or 
photographed while engaging in sexually explicit acts for the producer’s own pleasure or 
profit.  The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 was 
designed to address this inexcusable abuse of children.”); S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 4 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 42 (noting evidence taken by two convicted 
child pornographers and a seventeen-year-old boy who was coerced into prostitution and 
pornography, among other witness testimony). 
63. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1204 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
 64. John Curran, Vt. Teen Gets Reduced Sentence in ‘Sexting’ Case, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32681970/ns/technology_and_science-
tech_and_gadgets/; Pawloski, supra note 12; Taylor, supra note 12. 
65. Chris A. Courogen et al., Police Call 3 Teen Girls’ ‘Sexted’ Photos ‘Dumb’ 
Stuff, PATRIOT-NEWS, Jan. 30, 2009, at A01; Koch, supra note 59; Teens Avoid Detention in
Sexting Case, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 18, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR
3402125. 
66. See, e.g., Buckner, supra note 24; Ellis, supra note 6; Pawloski, supra note 12; 
Schorsch, supra note 38; Taylor, supra note 12. 
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to potential pedophiles.67  Prosecutors and judges have also stated that
they are trying to protect teens from themselves.68  Courts and prosecutors
have noted that sexted images may be sent to others, which could
humiliate the subjects.69  On the other hand, if courts are attempting to
protect teens from the stigma resulting from their own poor judgment, 
why add a criminal conviction to that shame?70  As one commentator
noted, a criminal prosecution requires that multiple adults—prosecutors,
police, judges, judicial staff, and jurors—see the images in question, not
just a few peers.71  Any teens who are forced to register as sex offenders 
will undoubtedly be socially stigmatized even more and for much longer.72 
Instead of these stated reasons, the answer may be that adults are
simply uncomfortable with adolescent sexuality and, though unwilling to 
criminalize it when they cannot see it, are still willing to criminalize the 
photographs of it that they do see.73  Even when statutory rape is reported,
police officers and district attorneys do not have to witness it, but sexting
prosecutions necessarily involve a video confirmation of adolescent sexual
activity. 
Whatever the reason for these prosecutions, the disparity between
permissible sexual activity and impermissible photography of that activity 
exists.  This disparity has already led to several constitutional challenges 
to child pornography, and this number can only increase as sexting
prosecutions increase.  There are four potential challenges to teenage 
sexting prosecutions where the teens are legally permitted to engage in
sexual activities: freedom of expression, equal protection, right to privacy, 
 67. Kimpel, supra note 16, at 314–16; see also Ellis, supra note 6 (“These kids are not 
sex offenders.  But they need to understand the consequences of their actions.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); More Sexting Charges Highlight Problem Among Teens, 
PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.patriotledger.com/news/cops_and_courts/x15
30318815/More-sexting-charges-highlight-problem-among-teens (“The [district attorney’s]
office holds workshops at schools to inform students about technology safety, including
sexting, as administrators recognize the need to show teens that the behavior is illegal.”). 
68. A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
69. See, e.g., id. at 239; Janice Morse, ‘Sexting’ Leads to 2 Arrests, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER, Mar. 5, 2009, at B3, available at 2009 WLNR 16847788 (“[T]he students 
should face some type of charge, to send the message that sharing such images is 
unacceptable and could have ‘lasting implications.’”). 
70. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (noting the stigma a criminal 
conviction imposes, even for misdemeanors). 
 71. Kimpel, supra note 16, at 315. 
 72. Richards & Calvert, supra note 48, at 6. 
 73. Kimpel, supra note 16, at 310–12 (discussing American society’s discomfort 
with adolescent sexuality).  There is also anecdotal evidence that some politicians are 
uncomfortable with nudity generally, as demonstrated by John Ashcroft’s famous covering of
the female Spirit of Justice statue in the Department of Justice.  Drapes Removed from 
Justice Department Statue, USA TODAY, June 24, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/washington/2005-06-24-doj-statue_x.htm. 
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and due process.  Some of these claims are more likely to succeed than
others. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
According to the Supreme Court, “[m]inors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”74  Both
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights protect the rights of 
minors, such as freedom of speech, equal protection, right to privacy, 
and due process in criminal proceedings.75  On the other hand, the state
does have the right to control the acts of minors to a greater extent than 
the acts of adults.76  The differences in the power of the state to regulate 
minors and adults have been resolved on a case-by-case basis. 
The rights that are implicated in teenage sexting prosecutions are the
rights to freedom of expression, equal protection, privacy, and due 
process.  The Supreme Court has dealt only with freedom of expression
challenges to child pornography statutes and has not ruled on a sexting 
case.  Other courts have applied all of the rights listed above to child 
pornography statutes, usually in cases involving adults as well as teens.
Most of the cases did not involve two teenagers, and almost all of the 
cases rejected the constitutional challenge. 
A.  First Amendment Challenge—Freedom of Expression 
1.  Standard of Review 
Courts have generally given substantial weight to First Amendment
challenges to statutes due to their concern with chilling speech.77 
Despite this, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that child 
pornography laws do not violate the First Amendment because of the 
compelling state interest in preventing child pornography.  In Ferber, the 
Supreme Court explicitly excluded the category of child pornography
74. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
75. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 692–93 & n.14 (1977).  The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child also has “freedom of expression”
and “right to privacy” provisions. See Cumming, supra note 22, at 10. 
76. Carey, 431 U.S. at 692. 
77. For example, a person can challenge the constitutionality of a statute on First 
Amendment grounds even if the statute could lawfully be applied to his or her conduct. 
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985). 
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from First Amendment protection.78  This categorical exclusion has been 
recognized in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.79  However, as shown
by Free Speech Coalition, the images must involve harm to an actual 
child for them to be part of this categorical exclusion.80  Virtual child 
pornography that does not harm children and is not obscene deserves
First Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court has never stated which standard of review to use
when analyzing First Amendment claims against child pornography
laws, which has led to confusion among the lower courts.  For example, 
citing Ferber, the Illinois Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny,81 
and the Eighth Circuit has applied the “rational basis” test.82 Most
courts have held that because Ferber stated that child pornography is 
criminalized because of the harm to its subjects and not because of the
content of its message, child pornography statutes cannot be classified as
content-based.83  Accordingly, these courts have applied intermediate 
scrutiny.84 
According to the Supreme Court, under intermediate scrutiny, “content-
neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it 
advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression 
of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than 
necessary to further those interests.”85  Moreover, “[u]nder intermediate 
scrutiny, the Government may employ the means of its choosing ‘so 
 78. Humbach, supra note 21, at 448–49. 
79. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008) (“Over the last 25 years, 
we have confronted a related and overlapping category of proscribable speech: child 
pornography.” (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Osborne v. 
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982))). 
80. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 249–50.  But see Benjamin A. Mains, Note,
Virtual Child Pornography, Pandering, and the First Amendment: How 
Developments in Technology and Shifting First Amendment Jurisprudence Have Affected 
the Criminalization of Child Pornography, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 809, 825 (2010) 
(arguing that Free Speech Coalition changed Ferber’s focus from harm to criminal acts). 
81. People v. Alexander, 791 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Ill. 2003) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. 
at 756–59). 
82. United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 629 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States 
v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1987)).  At least one commentator has agreed 
that because child pornography is excluded from First Amendment protection, it should
be scrutinized using the rational basis test. See Humbach, supra note 21, at 475–76. 
83. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 653 (E.D. Pa. 
2004) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757, 763–65); see also Connection Distrib. Co. v. 
Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 328–29 (6th Cir. 2009).
84. Connection Distrib. Co., 557 F.3d at 329; Free Speech Coal. v. Gonzales, 406 
F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1205–06 (D. Colo. 2005); Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 653; Am.
Library Ass’n v. Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp. 469, 476–77 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated, Am.
Library Ass’n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
85. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010) (quoting 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
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long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest 
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation’ and does 
not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further’ that 
interest.”86  According to American Library Ass’n v. Thornburgh: 
The key in determining the constitutionality of a law that “spills over” from a 
legitimate governmental interest—such as the effort against child pornography—
onto protected material is whether the legislation is ‘narrowly drawn’ to avoid as
much interference with protected material as possible while furthering the
legitimate governmental interest. 
 Courts must be especially vigilant in scrutinizing broad legislative efforts that 
clearly burden protected First Amendment material in the name of attacking
things not constitutionally protected.87 
2.  Application of First Amendment to Sexting Prosecutions
For child pornography laws to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, or any 
kind of scrutiny, the government’s interest in enacting the statute must 
be examined.  Every state in the United States and the federal government 
have enacted child pornography statutes.88  Although the terms may
differ slightly, the same basic behavior is criminalized.  The creation,
distribution, and possession of sexually explicit images of children are
subject to lengthy criminal sentences and, usually, registration on a sex
offender list.89  As noted by one commentator, the penalties are particularly 
harsh for child pornography because the law is generally very punitive 
towards pedophiles and pedophiles are the targets of child pornography
statutes.90 
A few states provide a reason for their child pornography statutes in 
the statutes themselves.  These rationales all emphasize protecting minors
from being victimized.  For example, section 617.247 of the Minnesota 
Statutes states that 
[i]t is the policy of the legislature in enacting this section to protect minors from 
the physical and psychological damage caused by their being used in
pornographic work depicting sexual conduct which involves minors.  It is
therefore the intent of the legislature to penalize possession of pornographic 
work depicting sexual conduct which involve minors or appears to involve
86. Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 213–14 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
87. Am. Library Ass’n, 713 F. Supp. at 476–77. 
 88. Shafron-Perez, supra note 2, at 437–39 & n.35. 
89. See generally id. at 436–41 (providing a detailed history of child pornography
laws). 
 90. Kimpel, supra note 16, at 309. 
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minors in order to protect the identity of minors who are victimized by
involvement in the pornographic work, and to protect minors from future 
involvement in pornographic work depicting sexual conduct.91 
Idaho is particularly interested in “commercial sexual exploitation of
children” because it “constitutes a wrongful invasion of the child’s right
of privacy and results in social, developmental, and emotional injury to 
the child.”92 For that reason, “to protect children from commercial
sexual exploitation it is necessary to prohibit the production for trade or
commerce of material which involves or is derived from such exploitation
and to exclude all such material from the channels of trade and
commerce.”93  Like Minnesota, Idaho criminalizes possession of child 
pornography “in order to protect the identity of children who are victimized 
by involvement in the photographic representations, and to protect
children from future involvement in photographic representations of
sexual conduct.”94  Colorado’s child pornography laws are premised on
preventing “sexual exploitation of children” because that exploitation 
“constitutes a wrongful invasion of the child’s right of privacy and results in
social, developmental, and emotional injury.”95  Colorado is also concerned 
with preventing child pornography from entering the market and “has a
compelling interest in outlawing the possession of any sexually exploitative
materials in order to protect society as a whole, and particularly the
privacy, health, and emotional welfare of its children.”96 
With regard to § 2251, Congress’s stated concerns with child
pornography are: 
(1) child pornography has developed into a highly organized, multi-million-
dollar industry which operates on a nationwide scale; 
(2) thousands of children including large numbers of runaway and homeless 
youth are exploited in the production and distribution of pornographic 
materials; and 
(3) the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the 
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the individual child and to
society.97 
The Supreme Court has issued multiple decisions that explain the 
purpose behind § 2251.  First, Ferber stated that § 2251 was created to
 91. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.247(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). 
 92. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1507(1) (2004 & Supp. 2010). 
93. Id.
94. Id. § 18-1507A(1). 
 95. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403(1) (2010). 
96. Id. § 18-6-403(1.5).
97. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006)). 
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prevent the “sexual exploitation and abuse of children.”98  The Court in
Ferber highlighted the multiple studies that document “the harmful
effects of sexual exploitation on children later in life and link[] children’s
participation in pornographic materials to molestation by adults.”99 
According to Ferber, the state’s interest in the creation of child
pornography laws is to safeguard the physical and psychological well-
being of minors.100  Child pornography statutes accomplish this by
deterring the abuse of children and the images that are created, which 
can repeatedly harm the child through their circulation, and by closing 
the distribution network of child pornography.101  The Supreme Court
noted that because the activity involved with child pornography is itself 
illegal, it does not offend the First Amendment to criminalize the
advertisement and selling of this illegal act.102  It was for these reasons
that the Supreme Court found that most child pornography is not 
protected by the First Amendment.  In Osborne, the Supreme Court held
that possession of child pornography could be a crime even though it had 
already ruled that the possession of obscenity could not be
criminalized.103  One of the Court’s main rationales for this holding was 
preventing child victims from being “haunt[ed]” by their participation in 
child pornography.104  The Court assumed that the child pornography 
images were the result of sexual abuse of the child.105 
Second, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition clarifies Ferber and 
Osborne by more explicitly linking child pornography’s exclusion from 
First Amendment protection to the illegal nature of the underlying 
activities.106  In Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court further
emphasized that it is child pornography’s “intrinsic[]” relationship to the 
98. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).  Indeed, the Court used the 
word exploit or its derivatives over twenty times in the decision.  See Humbach, supra 
note 21, at 464. 
 99. Mains, supra note 80, at 817–18. 
100. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–57. 
101. Id. at 759 & n.10. 
102. Id. at 761–62 (“It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of 
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & 
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (internal quotation marks omitted))); see also Osborne 
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990). 
103. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109–10. 
104. See id. at 111. 
105. See id.
106. See Humbach, supra note 21, at 461. 
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sexual abuse of children that makes it unprotected speech.107 Free 
Speech Coalition also noted that circulation of child pornography can
reinjure a child’s reputation and emotional well-being with each new 
publication.108 The Supreme Court also found that child pornography
laws’ aim to “dry up the market” showed that the speech had a “proximate
link to the crime from which it came.”109 
As these cases and statutes show, exploitation is a key component of 
states’ child pornography statutes.  Indeed, many states’ child pornography
statutes have the phrase child exploitation or exploitation of a minor in 
their titles.110 State courts have also construed the intent of their child
pornography statutes as, among other things, “rooting out the sexual 
exploitation of children.”111  According to Merriam-Webster, exploit means
“to make use of meanly or unfairly for one’s own advantage.”112 
107. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (quoting Ferber, 458 
U.S. at 759) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Mains, supra note 80, at 825, 
828 (arguing that Free Speech Coalition changed Ferber’s focus from harm to criminal 
acts involving actual children).
108. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 249 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 & n.10). 
109. Id. at 249–50 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
110. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3553 (2010) (“Sexual exploitation of a 
minor”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011) (“Sexual exploitation of 
child”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403 (2010) (“Sexual exploitation of a child”); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1108 (2007 & Supp. 2010) (“Sexual exploitation of a child”); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (2007 & Supp. 2010) (“Sexual exploitation of children”); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-1507 (2004 & Supp. 2010) (“Sexual exploitation of a child”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-4 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (“Child exploitation”); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 728.12 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (“Sexual exploitation of a minor”); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 282 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (“Sexual exploitation of minor”); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-31 (West 2010) (“Exploitation of children”); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 573.023 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (“Sexual exploitation of a minor”); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.16 (2009 & Supp. 2010) (“First degree sexual exploitation of a minor”); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-395 (2003 & Supp. 2010) (“First degree sexual exploitation of a 
minor defined”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1003 (2006) (“Offense of sexual exploitation
of a minor”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2010) (“Sexual 
exploitation of a minor”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.040 (West 2010) (“Sexual 
exploitation of a minor”).  Federal child pornography law also uses the phrase sexual 
exploitation of children in its title. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006). 
111. Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1991); see also McFadden v. State, 
No. CR-07-1923, 2010 WL 2562269, at *8 (Ala. Crim. App. June 25, 2010) (relying on
Ferber and Free Speech Coalition); State v. Watts, 2009-0912, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 
6/16/10); 41 So. 3d 625, 636 (“Through its enactment of La. R.S. 14:81.1, the legislature 
intended to prevent any child from ever being victimized by punishing equally any of 
four types of offenders for each action that contributes to that child’s sexual exploitation 
. . . .  Simply stated, preventing any child from being sexually victimized is the end to be 
achieved, and punishing both producers and consumers of child pornography equally is
the legislature’s chosen means by which to achieve this end.” (quoting State v. Fussell, 
06-2595, pp. 19–20 (La. 1/16/08); 974 So. 2d 1223, 1235)).
112. Exploit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster. 
com/dictionary/exploit (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). 
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By using the word exploit, the Court and state statutes are implicitly 
concerned with an adult’s misuse of power over a child that results in the 
child’s loss of personal dignity.113 
In order to ascertain whether sexting teens can claim their behavior 
has First Amendment protection, it is necessary to see whether their
images contain the same harms as traditional child pornography or
whether, like virtual child pornography, they are “victimless.”114  In any
event, in order for child pornography laws to be properly applied to 
sexting cases, the rationale behind these laws, as discussed by the Supreme 
Court, must apply.  Based on this case law, it is clear that, according to the
Supreme Court, the rationales behind child pornography laws—and the
reasons child pornography does not have First Amendment protection—are
(1) preventing harm to the child, (2) preventing the child from being
“haunted” by his or her participation in the child pornography, and
(3) “drying up the market” for child pornography.
a.  Exploitation of Children 
The most important goal of child pornography laws is to prevent the 
exploitation and abuse of children.  For that reason, “where the speech is 
neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside 
the protection of the First Amendment.”115  Even if the images could be
used to harm other children, the Supreme Court found that this harm was 
too “contingent and indirect . . . . [because the] harm does not necessarily 
follow from the speech, but depends upon some unquantified potential 
for subsequent criminal acts.”116  Due to the lack of proximate cause,
Free Speech Coalition held that “[v]irtual child pornography” was 
 113. Humbach, supra note 21, at 464–65. 
114. One researcher has created a list of potential harms of sexting: mental anguish, 
harassment from other teens, economic harm if employers see the photos, parental 
punishment, school punishment, criminal punishment, and social stigma.  See Calvert, 
supra note 7, at 23–25.  However, these harms are all contingent upon the images’ being
leaked to others aside from the teens engaged in the acts that are photographed.
Forwarded images also raise elements of lack of consent and what is known as 
cyberbullying, which, as discussed below, could be dealt with as a separate issue.  See id.
at 58–59; Arcabascio, supra note 4, at 30–31. 
115. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 251 (2002). 
116. Id. at 236; see also id. at 245 (“The prospect of crime, however, by itself does 
not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”); id. at 253 (“The mere tendency of 
speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”).
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protected by the First Amendment because it “records no crime and 
creates no victims by its production.”117  More specifically, 
[t]he evil in question depends upon the actor’s unlawful conduct, conduct 
defined as criminal quite apart from any link to the speech in question.  This
establishes that the speech ban is not narrowly drawn.  The objective is to
prohibit illegal conduct, but this restriction goes well beyond that interest by
restricting the speech available to law-abiding adults.118 
The key inquiry into whether purported child pornography is protected
by the First Amendment depends “upon how it was made, not on what it 
communicated.”119  Even if the images look like actual child pornography,
they may not be criminalized unless actual children were used to make
the images because “[t]he Government may not suppress lawful speech
as the means to suppress unlawful speech.  Protected speech does not 
become unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The
Constitution requires the reverse.”120  Without this causal link to criminal
activity, the images are protected by the First Amendment unless they
are legally obscene, which means they must satisfy specific criteria.121 
For example, “depictions of nudity, without more, constitute protected
expression,”122 and “speech may not be prohibited because it concerns
subjects offending our sensibilities.”123 
The Supreme Court used this criminal link requirement to refuse to
extend its classification of unprotected speech, such as child pornography, 
to images of animal abuse.124  The Court noted that child pornography is
a unique category “of unprotected speech” in which “‘the evil to be 
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any,
at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required,’ because 
‘the balance of competing interests is clearly struck.’”125 Therefore,
117. Id. at 250. 
118. Id. at 252–53.  This language affects Ferber’s holding that children are also
harmed by invasion of their privacy.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982).
119. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 251. 
120. Id. at 255; see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (emphasizing
the link to unlawful action).
121. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973) (holding that “pictures, 
films, paintings, drawings and engravings . . . have First Amendment protection” if 
determined to be not obscene); see also Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 591 
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing protection of photographs); State v. Bonner, 
61 P.3d 611, 614 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (summarizing Supreme Court protection of
various media).  For a discussion as to why sexting may or may not be legally obscene, 
see Humbach, supra note 21, at 444–47.  For the purposes of this Article, the sexting 
images in question will be presumed not legally obscene. 
122. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990). 
123. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 245. 
124. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010). 
125. Id. at 1586 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982)). 
Stevens also noted that the speech must be “used as an integral part of conduct in
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according to Ferber, Osborne, and Free Speech Coalition, child
pornography is not protected by the First Amendment because it is 
intrinsically related to the exploitation and abuse of children.  It is this 
direct harm to the victims of sexual abuse that removes any First 
Amendment protection from child pornography.  Both state and federal 
courts have therefore construed Free Speech Coalition to require that
child pornography statutes have a causal link between the images and
either child abuse or criminal activity.126 
Some states have used the reasoning in Free Speech Coalition and 
other Supreme Court cases such as Osborne to strike down other “virtual” 
child pornography statutes.  For example, in State v. Bonner, an Idaho 
appellate court struck down a statute on First Amendment grounds 
because the statute was not 
focused to proscribe only photographs and recordings that harm the child subjects; it 
sweeps within its prohibition even photographs of innocuous content which are 
taken without the child’s knowledge and which are not distributed or otherwise used
violation of a valid criminal statute.”  Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  But see Williams, 553 U.S. at 304–05 (focusing on the intent 
of the solicitor of child pornography, not on how it was created). 
126. See, e.g., United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that 
Free Speech Coalition struck down the virtual child pornography statute because it “did
not restrict the definition of child pornography to obscene material or to material that 
was itself the product of sexual abuse”); Bonner, 61 P.3d at 615 (“In child pornography, 
the Court said, ‘the images are themselves the product of child sexual abuse,’ and its 
distribution and sale, as well as its production, may be banned because those acts are
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children and exacerbate the harm to the child
victims.” (citing Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 249)); State v. Tooley, 114 Ohio St. 3d 
366, 2007-Ohio-3698, 872 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 19 (“The court held that these provisions 
were unconstitutionally overbroad because they criminalized material that was neither 
obscene under Miller nor sufficiently related to the abuse of a minor during its 
production process as described by Ferber.” (citing Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 246, 
250)); State v. Martin, 2003 SD 153, ¶ 21, 674 N.W.2d 291, 298–99 (“Because Ferber’s 
rationale of classifying child pornography as unprotected speech relied upon the 
government’s interest in protecting children harmed in the production process, the 
[federal statute’s] criminalization of pornography that did not involve the exploitation of 
actual children was unconstitutionally overbroad.” (citing Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at
250–52)); State v. Pickett, 211 S.W.3d 696, 702 (Tenn. 2007) (“[T]he Court concluded 
that the statutory provision at issue was overbroad because it criminalized even those
images that were not obscene and that did not involve the exploitation of actual children, 
such as computer-generated images or the use of adults that appear to be minors.” (citing
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 250–56)); see also State v. Dalton, 153 Ohio App. 3d 
286, 2003-Ohio-3813, 793 N.E.2d 509, at ¶¶ 22–24 (noting that child pornography laws 
“help[] protect the victims of child pornography” and child sexual abuse (citing Osborne, 
495 U.S. at 109)). 
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in a manner that could inflict physical or psychological injury on the child.  Such an 
undifferentiating ban is inconsistent with the First Amendment.127  
Similarly, in State v. Zidel, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held
that photos of minor girls that were combined with nude adult female 
bodies were protected by the First Amendment because “when no part of
the image is ‘the product of sexual abuse,’ and a person merely possesses 
the image, no demonstrable harm results to the child whose face is
depicted in the image.”128 
No court has examined a First Amendment challenge to a child
pornography statute as it relates to sexting teens.129  However, it appears
that the exploitation rationale behind child pornography laws could not 
apply to consensual teenage sexting.  The consensual sexual acts between 
the teens considered in this Article would be legal under statutory rape
laws with Romeo and Juliet exceptions, and the images would therefore 
be recording a legal act between, essentially, adults.  Similarly, due to 
the consensual nature of the sexual acts and the photographing of these 
acts, which took place between peers, there is no implication of abuse or 
exploitation. Instead, teens may feel sexually empowered when they
photograph themselves or their partners.130  When an adult is involved 
with the creation of sexually explicit images of minors, there is an inherent 
power imbalance, and money is more likely to be offered.  Moreover, 
even if the consensual images were distributed without a party’s consent, 
the images themselves do not record an abusive or criminal act and
therefore do not satisfy this child pornography law rationale. 
Even when the images are sent to others without a party’s consent, the 
intent of the sender and the harm involved is not the same.  Traditional 
child pornography is created and distributed with the intent to sexually
arouse the recipient or possessor.131  When sexually explicit messages
are sent to a teen’s peers without his or her consent, the sender usually 
intends for the images to humiliate or harass the victim, not to arouse the 
127. Bonner, 61 P.3d at 616. 
128. State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 263 (N.H. 2008) (citation omitted) (citing Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 249). 
129. The Third Circuit explicitly did not rule on a sexting teen’s freedom of 
expression claim because it was not fully briefed on appeal.  Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 
139, 147–48 (3d Cir. 2010).  Instead, the court dealt with a related First Amendment 
claim by the parents of a teen who was threatened with criminal prosecution for sexting 
unless she attended an “education” class.  The Third Circuit found that the threat of 
prosecution was retaliatory for the teen’s refusing to take the class, which violated her 
First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.  Id. at 155. 
 130. Kimpel, supra note 16, at 327–28. 
131. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 308 (“Congress’ aim was to target
materials advertised, promoted, presented, distributed, or solicited with a lascivious 
purpose—that is, with the intention of inciting sexual arousal.”). 
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recipients of the image.  Often, the images are sent as retaliation for a
breakup or other perceived injustice.132  The only harm sexting teens
complain of is being harassed and teased by their peers after an image is
sent to them, and prosecutors seem to be interested in preventing these
negative effects.133 
Nonconsensual sharing of sexually explicit photos can be considered 
cyberbullying, which can be addressed as a separate problem from the
original consensual sexting.  Cyberbullying is defined as “when a child, 
preteen, or teen is tormented, threatened, harassed, humiliated, embarrassed 
or otherwise targeted by another child, preteen, or teen using the Internet, 
interactive and digital technologies or mobile phones.”134  According to 
independent studies, cyberbullying is much more common than sexting
and can cause similarly harmful results such as social ostracism and 
even suicide.135  Cyberbullying has already been considered by several 
state legislatures because of its harmful effects.  Several states have statutes 
requiring schools to educate students about and punish cyberbullying,136 
and others include cyberbullying in criminal harassment statutes.137  In 
short, even though bullying by peers as the result of sexting can be 
perceived as “harm,” it is not the harm envisioned by child pornography 
statutes.
 132. Richards & Calvert, supra note 48, at 7–8; Pawloski, supra note 12. 
 133. Buckner, supra note 24; Ellis, supra note 6; Feldman, supra note 24; More 
Sexting Charges Highlight Problem Among Teens, supra note 67. 
 134. Colleen Barnett, Cyberbullying: A New Frontier and a New Standard—A
Survey of and Proposed Changes to State Cyberbullying Statutes, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
579, 580 (2009) (quoting What Is Cyberbullying Exactly?, STOP CYBERBULLYING,
http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html (last visited Aug. 
8, 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
135. See id. at 582–83; see also Cara J. Ottenweller, Cyberbullying: The Interactive 
Playground Cries for a Clarification of the Communications Decency Act, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1285, 1289, 1290 & n.30, 1291 (2007) (discussing types of cyberbullying). 
136. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D(f)(1) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1006.147(7)(a) (West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A(2)(b) (West 2010); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 280.28(2)(a)–(b) (West Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-
424.1(2)(i) (LEXIS through 2010 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West Supp.
2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285 (West Supp. 2011); Barnett, supra note 
134, at 579.  Some scholars have argued that these measures are insufficient because
they do not affect behavior that occurs off school property. See Todd D. Erb, Comment, 
A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction To Punish Off-Campus Incidents 
of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 284–85 (2008). 
 137. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(1)(b) (McKinney 2008). 
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The second rationale to be considered is the “haunting” rationale. 
Child pornography is exempt from the First Amendment in part because
the images of the pornography reinjure the subjects every time they are 
viewed.138  For sexting teens, this rationale is questionable because, as
discussed above, the image is not of abuse so they cannot be haunted by
the painful memory of when the image was taken.139  According to 
Zidel, “[t]he mere possession of morphed images depicting no victims of 
child pornography cannot ‘haunt[] the children in years to come,’ since 
the children do not know of their existence and did not participate in
their production.”140 
Even if other teens see the images without the poser’s consent, it is 
unlikely that they will be “haunted” in the way Ferber imagined.141 
Research has shown that teens who look at pornography involving other 
teens do not see the images the same way a child predator would see 
them.142  They are simply looking at their peers.143  As noted above, if
the image is passed to other teens, this may cause some embarrassment
or even humiliation, but this kind of embarrassment is not on par with
being reminded of past sexual abuse.  Therefore, the government has 
less of an interest in preventing it or can prevent it by attacking the
bullying directly.144  The haunting rationale is even more questionable
for teens who voluntarily post images of themselves on public websites 
and clearly want their images to be seen.145  In short, regret for a foolish 
act is not on par with being haunted with reminders of past abuse at the 
hands of a trusted adult.146 
138. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 
§ 102(3), 122 Stat. 4001, 4001 (2008); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990); 
United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 929 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 139. Humbach, supra note 21, at 466. 
140. State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 263 (N.H. 2008) (second alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111). 
141. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982). 
 142. Kimpel, supra note 16, at 320. 
143. Id. at 314–16. Ms. Kimpel casts doubt on the “haunting harm” rationale by
noting that we do not protect victims of other crimes, even sexual assault crimes, from 
the images of their victimization. Id. at 320–21.  As noted by Ms. Kimpel, “[n]ormally
crimes themselves are prosecuted, not the photographic evidence of those crimes.”  Id. at
321. 
 144. Humbach, supra note 21, at 466. But see Buckner, supra note 24 (noting that a 
girl hanged herself after being taunted by classmates when an ex-boyfriend showed 
naked photos she had sent to him). 
145. See Kimpel, supra note 16, at 323. 
146. See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that 
the court was protecting the defendant from her own lack of good judgment by affirming
her conviction). 
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c.  Drying Up the Market
The final rationale behind child pornography laws is the government’s
desire to dry up the market for child pornography.  There is some
evidence for an overlap between sexting and the traditional child 
pornography market.  Not only can teens forward photos that were
meant to be kept private—and there are many instances of that—but 
some sexting behavior involves teens posting nude pictures of themselves 
on social networking sites.147  These images can be co-opted by pedophiles, 
and according to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, “5.4% of the images of child pornography observed on the 
Internet appear to be self-produced.”148 
Although some sexting cases involve teens who post images of 
themselves on public websites, the vast majority of cases involve the 
sharing of images between teens alone.149  Even images that are
distributed without the other party’s consent generally go to other teens 
or to people the distributing or nonconsenting party knows, not to the 
general public.150  Moreover, even publicly posted images are different 
from traditional child pornography images because, as shown above, 
they do not portray a victim.  Because these images do not record 
instances of sexual abuse or exploitation, they may be more akin to 
virtual child pornography, particularly for teens who are above the age 
of consent but below the child pornography age.  In those instances, it is 
as if two adults who happen to look like children are in the images, 
exactly the kind of images that Free Speech Coalition stated was
protected by the First Amendment.151 
 147. Alan Wagmeister, Two Teen Girls Face Child Porn Charges . . . for Their 
Own Pictures, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 29, 2006, available at http://www.digtriad.com/
news/story.aspx?storyid=60478; Teen Girl Charged with Posting Nude Photos on
Internet, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/ 
2004-03-29-child-self-porn_x.htm. 
 148. Leary, supra note 2, at 19.  There is also a group of teenagers who apparently
create pornography for money using themselves as subjects. Id. at 24–25. 
149. See, e.g., Buckner, supra note 24; Ellis, supra note 6; Pawloski, supra note 12; 
Schorsch, supra note 38; Taylor, supra note 12. 
 150. Buckner, supra note 24; Richards & Calvert, supra note 48, at 6; Simmons,
supra note 59; Taylor, supra note 12; see also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d
Cir. 2010) (stating that images were passed around between male students); A.H., 949 
So. 2d at 237 (stating that images were not shared beyond couple). 
151. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 270–71 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
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d.  Chilling Speech 
Even if the government’s reason for prosecuting sexting was
“important” enough to justify prosecuting sexting teens under child 
pornography statutes, these prosecutions may still “burden substantially
more speech than necessary to further those interests.”152  Sexting 
prosecutions under child pornography laws carry sufficient penalties to 
effectively chill the speech of teens who wish to express themselves 
sexually.153  Considering the differences in harm and consent in sexting 
cases compared with traditional child pornography, it would be relatively
easy for the government to carve out an exception for sexting teens, as 
quite a few states have done already.  For that reason, teens may have a 
viable First Amendment defense to sexting prosecutions. 
B.  Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned
with differential treatment of citizens based on arbitrary or suspect
characteristics.  According to the Supreme Court, “the Fourteenth
Amendment permits the states a wide scope of discretion in enacting
laws that affect some groups of citizens differently than others.  The 
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on 
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”154 
If a law does not create a suspect classification or impinge upon 
constitutionally protected rights, it need only satisfy a rational basis 
test.155  This test is the most relaxed and deferential of the equal protection
standards and allows some inequality as long as there is no “invidious
discrimination” or “wholly arbitrary” conduct.156 
The Supreme Court has held that age is not a suspect classification 
due to the lack of a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” and the 
fact that age can be relevant to a legitimate state interest.157  For that  
reason, “[s]tates may discriminate on the basis of age without offending
the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”158  The Supreme Court 
has also approved of state regulation of the acts of teenagers so that they 
152. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010). 
153. See Kimpel, supra note 16, at 323. 
154. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 424–25 (1961). 
155. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23 (1989) (citing San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 44 (1973)). 
156. Id. at 26–27. 
157. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000) (quoting Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam)). 
158. Id.
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are not corrupted by older adults and has held that such a regulation does 
not violate equal protection.159 
With regard to sexting cases, equal protection claims have centered on
claims of disparate treatment because of age.  It is indisputable that 
adults are permitted to possess sexually explicit, and even obscene,
photos of adults and that these photos are protected under the First 
Amendment.160  In fact, there are no criminal penalties for posting sexually 
explicit photos of adults on the Internet without their permission.161 
Minors are clearly treated differently because of age.  There is also some
evidence of arbitrariness in the legislative age restrictions for sexual
activity and recording that activity. For example, Colorado’s child
pornography statute states “that a child below the age of eighteen years 
is incapable of giving informed consent to the use of his or her body for 
a sexual purpose,”162 but its age of consent is seventeen.163 
Despite these inconsistencies, equal protection claims in sexting cases
have failed repeatedly because they do not implicate a fundamental right 
or a suspect class.  One court found that child pornography is not
protected by the Constitution, so any age restrictions must only satisfy
the rational basis test.164  Congress’s stated reason for raising the age of
consent was to assist with the prosecution of child pornography.165 In 
1984, well before sexting was even possible, the federal government 
raised the maximum age of § 2251 from sixteen to eighteen in order to 
assist prosecutors in proving that the child in the disputed pornographic 
photos is a minor.166  Because teens reach puberty at different ages, the
legislative committee found that it was difficult to prove that the child in 
the picture was under sixteen but that it would be easier to prove that the 
child was under eighteen.167  This reason was found to be rationally
related to the enforcement of the statute.168  In another case, the defendant’s
equal protection argument failed because the court held that there is no
159. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24–25. 
 160. Kimpel, supra note 16, at 301 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568
(1969)). 
161. Id. at 322–23. 
 162. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403(1) (2010). 
163. Id. § 18-3-402(1)(e). 
164. United States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1987). 
165. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 3 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 494. 
166. Id.; United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 629 (8th Cir. 2005). 
167. Freeman, 808 F.2d at 1293. 
168. Id.
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fundamental right to sexual privacy for minors, so the child pornography
statute needed only to pass a rational basis test, which it easily passed.169 
These decisions show that teens are unlikely to succeed using an equal 
protection claim. It is unlikely that courts will find that their sexual
expression is a fundamental right, so the child pornography statutes will
only have to satisfy a rational basis test based on age classifications. 
States’ stated goals of protecting children from sexual exploitation are 
likely to satisfy this deferential test. 
C.  Right to Privacy 
The Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy applies to activities
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
and child rearing and education.170  In Lawrence v. Texas, this right was
extended to sexual intimacy between consenting adults.171 Although the
right to privacy applies to minors, statutes that affect a minor’s right to 
privacy receive less scrutiny “because of the States’ greater latitude to
regulate the conduct of children” and because the law has generally 
regarded minors as having a lesser capability for making important
decisions.172  For that reason, according to Carey v. Population Services,
a state can inhibit the privacy rights of minors if the legislation serves
“any significant state interest . . . that is not present in the case of an
adult.”173 
The right of privacy has been successfully used by teens to protect
their sexual rights in the past.  Most notably, the Vermont Supreme 
Court held its state’s statutory rape law to be inapplicable where both 
sexual partners are below the age of consent because a person within the 
169. State v. Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810, 818 (Neb. 2005).  The mistake of age defense 
has also been raised under equal protection grounds where the defense is available for 
children between twelve and sixteen but not available for children under twelve.
Because age is not a suspect classification, courts have upheld these age distinctions. 
United States v. Juvenile Male, 211 F.3d 1169, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We agree that 
Congress could rationally conclude that minors under the age of twelve need different,
and greater, protection from sexual abuse than those over the age of twelve.”); Gilmour 
v. Rogerson, 117 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that even “sexually sophisticated
seventeen-year-olds” are entitled to protection because “[t]he State’s interest in
discouraging minors from posing as adults by eliminating the mistake-of-age defense is
entitled to great weight”).
170. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973); see also Wilson v. Collins, 517
F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing these rights as “fundamental”); Catsouras v. 
Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 385 (Ct. App. 2010). 
171. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
172. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977). 
173. Id. at 693 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daniel Allender, Note,
Applying Lawrence: Teenagers and the Crime Against Nature, 58 DUKE L.J. 1825,
1844–45 (2009) (discussing cases that have addressed privacy rights of minors). 
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protection of the statutory rape law cannot be charged with violating the 
statute.174 The court based this holding in part on minors’ privacy
rights.175  The court ultimately held that the statutory rape statute is 
“inapplicable in cases where the alleged perpetrator is also a victim
under the age of consent” because “the statute is intended as a shield for
minors and not a sword against them.”176 This reasoning could easily be
applied to sexting cases because teens are both perpetrators and victims
of child pornography.
Despite these similarities, however, defendants have been unsuccessful in
asserting their privacy rights in consensual child pornography cases.  In
two cases, a defendant has made a claim that federal child pornography
statutes, which set the age of consent at eighteen, violate minors’ privacy
rights because in some states, minors at the age of sixteen or seventeen
may marry and engage in legally sanctioned sexual intercourse.177 
However, neither of these challenges has been brought by teenagers. 
Instead, older adults charged with child pornography have brought these 
claims on behalf of their underage sexual partners, which were dismissed in
large part for lack of standing.178 
In two other cases, adults brought right of privacy claims on their own
behalf.  In United States v. Bach, the defendant argued that the images 
he took of a sixteen-year-old boy were protected by the liberty and 
privacy components of the Fifth Amendment.179  The defendant relied on
Lawrence for the proposition that private and consensual conduct 
between same-sex partners is protected under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.180  The court in Bach factually distinguished
Lawrence on the grounds that that case involved two adults and the case 
at bar involved a forty-one-year-old man taking photos of a sixteen-year-
old boy.181  The court found that Bach’s right to privacy argument failed 
because the “Constitution offers less protection when sexually explicit 
174. In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 302 (Vt. 2000). 
175. Id. at 307. 
176. Id. at 309. 
177. United States v. Shreck, No. 03-CR-0043-CVE, 2006 WL 2945368, at *2 
(N.D. Okla. Oct. 13, 2006); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (D. Md. 
2005). 
178. Shreck, 2006 WL 2945368, at *1; Sherr, 400 F. Supp. at 849. 
179. United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 628 (8th Cir. 2005). 
180. Id.
181. Id. at 628–29. 
 979










   
  
   
   










   
    
 
 











   
material depicts minors rather than adults.”182 Bach also contained many 
elements of coercion that were relied upon by the court, such as the age 
disparity between the parties and the fact that the victim testified that he 
was coerced with an offer of money after he had repeatedly refused to 
participate.183  The court noted that Lawrence specifically did not address
cases of minors or cases where there was coercion.184  Under a rational
basis test, the statutes at issue were easily found to be constitutional. 
In State v. Senters, the defendant was a twenty-eight-year-old high
school teacher who videotaped himself and a seventeen-year-old female
student having consensual sex.185  In Nebraska, the age of consent is
sixteen, but its child pornography laws apply to minors under eighteen.186 
The defendant, Senters, argued that this inconsistency violated his
constitutional right to privacy and equal protection under the law.187 The
court applied the rational basis test to Senters’s right of privacy
argument by limiting Lawrence to sexual relations between adults.188 
The statute satisfied a rational basis test due to the potential dangers of
recording sexual acts:
Even for those who record an intimate act and intend for it to remain secret, a
danger exists that the recording may find its way into the public sphere,
haunting the child participant for the rest of his or her life.  It is reasonable to
conclude that persons 16 and 17 years old, although old enough to consent to
sexual relations, may not fully appreciate that today’s recording of a private, 
intimate moment may be the Internet’s biggest hit next week.189 
The significant state interest standard enunciated in Carey v. Population 
Services was not mentioned.
Both Bach and Senters are distinguishable from teenage sexting cases 
because they involved adults who took photos or video recordings of 
teenagers, which more closely resembles the harm Free Speech Coalition,
Osborne, and Ferber were trying to eliminate.190 Bach is distinguishable
because of the large age difference between the parties and the efforts of
the defendant to coerce the victim into participating through promises of
monetary payment.191 Senters is also distinguishable because of the age
182. Id. at 629 (quoting United States v. Vincent, 167 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 
1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
183. Id. at 628–29. 
184. Id. at 629. 
185. State v. Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Neb. 2005). 
 186. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1463.02(1) to .03 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
187. Senters, 699 N.W.2d at 813–14. 
188. Id. at 817. 
189. Id.
190. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio, 
495 U.S. 103, 109–11 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982). 
191. United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2005). 
980
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disparity and the defendant’s position of authority as a teacher.192  This 
position of authority may have created an element of coercion with
which the courts were particularly concerned.193  Accordingly, these cases
contain elements of sexual exploitation of minors and more closely
resemble traditional child pornography.
Only one Florida court of appeal case has dealt with sexting between
two teens, and it too found that the right to privacy did not bar criminal 
prosecution.  The court handled the matter in a different way from the
two courts above; it held that the teens involved in the sexting had no 
expectation of privacy and therefore no right to privacy.194  The teens in 
A.H. had taken photos of themselves involved in sexual activities and
had not shared the photos with anyone, although they had transmitted
them to another computer.195  However, the court held that, despite the
fact that the teens had not shared the photos with anyone else, “[n]either 
had a reasonable expectation that the other would not show the photos to 
a third party.”196  The court based its findings on the teens’ relative
immaturity, which meant that they could “have no reasonable expectation 
that their relationship will continue and that the photographs will not be 
shared with others intentionally or unintentionally.”197  The court even
hypothesized that one of the teens could sell the photos for profit in the 
child pornography market or share them with peers to show off his or
her sexual prowess.198  The teens’ subjective belief that they would not 
share the photographs was held to be less persuasive than the court’s 
own predictions of their future behavior.199 
192. Senters, 699 N.W.2d at 813. 
193. In many states, special rules apply if the defendant is in a position of authority
or is a teacher.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 771(c) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(4)(a) (West 2001 
& Supp. 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(a)–(b) (Supp. 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 709.14 to .15 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(d)–(f) 
(2009). 
194. A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
195. Id.
196. Id.  The court later described this distribution as “likely” and seemed to take 
the future breakup as a given.  Id. 
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 237–38 (“The right to privacy has not made each person a solipsistic 
island of self-determination.”).  The court did note that one of the teens expressed 
concern to law enforcement that the other might “do something disagreeable with the 
photographs.”  Id. at 238. 
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The court concluded that even if a right to privacy did exist, the statute 
served a compelling state interest in preventing the creation of sexually 
explicit images of minors, no matter who created them.200  Couched in
terms of protecting the teens, the court held that they were “not mature 
enough to make rational decisions concerning all the possible negative 
implications of producing these videos.”201  Ostensibly to protect the
teens “from their own lack of judgment” and the “future damage” that
may be done to their careers or personal lives, the court found that the 
state had a compelling interest in criminalizing their behavior.202  The  
Supreme Court of Florida declined to review the appellate court’s decision 
on appeal.203 This paradoxical decision has been met with criticism204 
but seems to echo the beliefs of many of the judges, school administrators, 
and prosecutors who seek to “protect” teens by arresting them and
punishing them.  These judges and prosecutors have apparently ignored 
the Supreme Court’s concern in Lawrence that criminalizing the behavior of
teens can stigmatize them as criminals.205  These holdings indicate that
sexting teens’ right to privacy claims are unlikely to be successful,
especially if courts use the highly deferential rational basis standard.
D.  Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can be invoked 
when an otherwise valid law is “so overbroad that it encroaches on
protected expression or so vague that prosecuting a person under the
statute would effectively deprive that person of due process of law.”206 
Due process claims could be brought in three different ways to
200. Id. at 239; accord State v. Vezzoni, No. 22361-2-III, 2005 WL 980588, at *1 
(Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2005) (holding that a teenager’s right to privacy was not 
violated because of the state’s compelling interest in preventing child pornography).
201. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239. 
202. Id. at 238–39. 
203. A.H. v. State, 959 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2007). 
204. See, e.g., Terri Day, The New Digital Dating Behavior—Sexting: Teens’ 
Explicit Love Letters: Criminal Justice or Civil Liability, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 69, 86–87 (2010). 
205. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).  In addition, courts have 
shown themselves to be unsympathetic to claims by teenagers that the laws were not 
meant to apply to them.  Two Washington appellate courts have addressed claims that 
Washington’s child pornography laws should not apply to teens because the legislature 
intended that these laws apply only to adults.  Vezzoni, 2005 WL 980588, at *2; State v. 
D.H., 9 P.3d 253, 256 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).  Both courts found that because the 
legislature did not make such a distinction in the statute, it intended that the law apply to 
minors as well.  Vezzoni, 2005 WL 980588, at *2; D.H., 9 P.3d at 256. 
206. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)), overruled in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
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invalidate child pornography prosecutions of sexting teens.  First, the
statute may be declared to be overbroad because it criminalizes
constitutionally protected behavior.  Second, the statute may not give 
fair notice of what is criminal because of different age standards.  Third, 
the statute may be prone to discriminatory enforcement by prosecutors
who are given too much leeway due to the mismatch between child
pornography laws and sexting.
1.  Overbroad Statute 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects people 
from statutes that are overly broad in that they prohibit constitutionally
protected freedoms.207  If a statute is “substantial[ly]” overbroad, it cannot 
be enforced against anyone until it is properly limited either through 
judicial interpretation or legislative intervention.208  The statute is not
substantially overbroad if it has only “some possibly impermissible
application” but the statute generally “covers a whole range of easily
identifiable and constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct.”209 
Claims of overbreadth have been successfully applied to child
pornography statutes.  Recently, an Idaho court of appeals invalidated 
Idaho’s child pornography statute because the statute barred “the creation of
photographs or electronic recordings without regard to whether those 
materials are obscene or constitute child pornography.”210  Because the
statute also prohibited innocuous photographs of children that were 
never distributed or used in a way that could harm children, it was 
declared overbroad as chilling protected speech.211 
Child pornography statutes may also be overbroad because they apply
to teens who can legally have consensual sex.  A federal district court 
held that § 2251 was overbroad but did not ultimately violate the First 
207. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940); Schwartzmiller v. 
Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1984). 
208. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503–04 (1985) (quoting 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1973)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
209. Sec’y of Md. v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 964–65 (1984) (quoting U.S. 
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580–81 (1973)). 
210. State v. Bonner, 61 P.3d 611, 615 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). 
211. Id. at 615–16. The statute’s limitation to photographs made with the intent of 
arousing lust was held to be an invalid prohibition on thoughts. Id. at 616. 
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Amendment when Congress raised the age from sixteen to eighteen.212 
The court found that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds “are sufficiently 
‘adult’ so as to be no longer the legitimate subjects of protection of 
‘children’ . . . .  At age 18, society would allow these persons to vote and
to volunteer for a wholly foreign war.”213  The court also noted that
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds were far more likely to be sexually
active, and the acts to be portrayed on film would therefore be more
natural to the performers.214  The court also found that teenagers aged
sixteen and seventeen could be part of serious artistic work or simulated 
sexual activity whereas sexually explicit material involving children 
aged fifteen and younger would be unlikely to have any other purpose 
than pornography.215  For that reason, “[a] blanket prohibition which
requires that no one under the age of 18 be permitted to perform even the 
most innocuous physical acts, in simulation, goes well beyond Congress’ 
legitimate interest of protecting children.”216  Despite these findings, 
because the statutes considered in Ferber were upheld by the Supreme 
Court even though one had an age limit of eighteen, the court was forced
to conclude that § 2251 could not be struck down facially on First
Amendment grounds, “at least until such time as a case is presented in 
which the alleged overbreadth of the statute is urged by someone
affected by it.”217 
It is unclear what courts would make of overbreadth challenges to
child pornography statutes as applied to sexting teens.  The one case that
accepted an overbreadth challenge was vacated on appeal, and the issue
was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit.  Another state court has shown 
that it is prepared to strike a child pornography statute on overbreadth 
grounds no matter how good the legislature’s intent was.  The fact that 
212. United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421, 1429–30 (C.D. Cal. 1987), 
vacated, United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988). 
213. Id.  The court also noted that Congress’s intent when raising the age was to 
protect younger children aged thirteen or fourteen who might appear to look older. Id. at
1429 n.42; see also Sharilyn E. Christiansen, The Child Protection Act: A 
Blanket Prohibition Smothering Constitutionally Protected Expression, 9 LOY. ENT. L.J. 
301, 311–12 (1989).
214. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1431. 
215. Id.
216. Id.; see also Robert R. Strang, “She Was Just Seventeen . . . and the Way She 
Looked Was Way Beyond [Her Years]”: Child Pornography and Overbreadth, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1779, 1790 (1990). 
217. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1432 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 780– 
81 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).  Kantor was vacated on appeal by the Ninth Circuit, 
which held that the First Amendment requires § 2251 defendants be entitled to a mistake 
of age defense and did not reach the First Amendment issues involved with § 2251’s age 
of consent. U.S. Dist. Court, 858 F.2d at 540–41 (“[I]mposition of major criminal 
sanctions on these defendants without allowing them to interpose a reasonable mistake of
age defense would choke off protected speech.”).
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sexting behavior may be protected by the First Amendment may also
make courts more willing to limit child pornography statutes so that they
do not impinge upon this protected behavior.  However, despite media 
attention to sexting prosecutions, these prosecutions are still relatively 
rare and may be considered to be infrequent enough that courts will see 
child pornography statutes as still mainly applicable to conduct that is 
properly criminalized.218 
2.  Void for Vagueness 
The “void for vagueness” doctrine of the Due Process Clause addresses
concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary and discriminatory
prosecutions.219 
a.  Lack of Fair Notice 
The Supreme Court has held that a “conviction fails to comport with
due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.”220 
“A citizen may be presumed to know the content of the law so long as 
the relevant statute is not ‘so technical or obscure that it threatens to 
ensnare individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.’”221 
Moreover, when a statute “interferes with the right of free speech or of 
association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”222  This  
stringent test applies to legislation banning child pornography because 
the legislation regulates speech.  Therefore, according to an Idaho court, 
218. Indeed, despite the voluminous media reports about sexting teens being 
arrested, there are very few that report actual sentencing.  This Author’s research has 
indicated that most sexting teens are not criminally indicted and are probably punished, 
if at all, through their schools or the juvenile justice system.  It should be noted that this 
lack of enforcement does not ameliorate the need for states to correct the constitutional 
deficiencies in their child pornography laws.  One zealous prosecutor is all it would take 
to force the issue in court. 
219. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 (2010). 
220. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); see also Salter v. State,
906 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Iowa 
2007). 
221. United States v. Anderson, 605 F.3d 404, 412–13 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 219 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
222. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982); 
see also Strang, supra note 216, at 1790 (“[W]hen first amendment rights are implicated, 
the decision to abstain from an activity becomes problematic.  In fact, the overbreadth 
doctrine exists to prevent that very abstention.” (footnote omitted)). 
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the terms of child pornography statutes must be adequately defined, and
the statutes must be “limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct
by children below a specified age.”223 
In United States v. Williams, the Supreme Court recently limited 
vagueness claims against the federal child pornography statute by
holding that vagueness does not exist just because it will sometimes be
difficult to determine whether the elements of the crime have been 
proven.224  Instead, vagueness exists when it is difficult to understand 
exactly what is illegal.225  Consequently, the Court held that a statute that
criminalized the distribution of photographs with the belief that they
were a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct was not overly broad or vague.226 
Two defendants have brought lack of fair notice challenges to child 
pornography statutes.  In the first case, the defendant’s procedural due
process argument was summarily rejected by the court.227  The defendant
argued that because Nebraska statutes had multiple age definitions for
what constituted a “child,” these statutes did not provide sufficient
notice.228  However, the court held that vagueness applies only when the
defendant does not have fair notice of exactly what conduct is forbidden.229 
Because the statute at issue clearly defined the term children as people 
under eighteen years old, it was clear enough to satisfy due process.230 
Recently, in Salter v. State, a state court held that an Indiana child 
pornography statute was void for vagueness when the “victim” was
sixteen, over the state’s age of consent.231  The Indiana Court of Appeals 
used the void for vagueness doctrine to hold that a defendant could not 
be held criminally liable for sending pictures of his genitals to a sixteen-
year-old girl even though Indiana’s child pornography laws criminalized
such a transmission to any person under eighteen years old.232  The statute
in question made it a criminal offense when a person “knowingly or
intentionally . . . disseminates matter to minors that is harmful to 
minors.”233  The crux of Salter’s argument was that he could not know
that sending a picture of his genitals to the victim was “harmful” when
showing them in person would not be harmful and would be perfectly 
223. State v. Bonner, 61 P.3d 611, 614–15 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). 
224. Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. 
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. State v. Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. 2005). 
228. Id. at 819. 
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Salter v. State, 906 N.E.2d 212, 221, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
232. Id. at 221–23; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-3-3 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). 
233. Salter, 906 N.E.2d at 222 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-3-3). 
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legal.234  The court agreed with Salter and held that the disparity between 
Indiana’s age of consent, sixteen, and the maximum age of its child
pornography statutes, eighteen, was void for vagueness because it did 
not “clearly define its prohibitions.”235 
Salter’s holding was premised on the fact that the age of consent
means that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds can engage in sexual
activity and “sexual activity could involve varying degrees of nudity and 
necessarily involves some exposure of the genitals.”236  For that reason, 
the court held that 
[b]y setting the legal age of consent at sixteen, the Indiana legislature has made 
an implied policy choice that in-person viewing of another person’s genitals is 
“suitable matter” for a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old child.  That being so, how 
could Salter have known that a picture of his genitals would be “harmful,” that 
is, not “suitable,” for M.B.?  Asked another way, if such images are harmful to
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old children, then why would our legislature allow 
those children to view the same matter in-person, in the course of sexual
activity?  These questions reveal the flaw in Indiana Code section 35-49-3-3 as 
applied to Salter: when read in light of well-established Indiana law setting the 
age of consent to sexual relations, it did not provide him with fair notice that the
State would consider pictures of his genitals harmful to or unsuitable for a
sixteen-year-old girl.237 
Salter is unique because the statute in question contained a requirement
that the material “harm” the minor, whereas most child pornography 
statutes only require that the images be sexual or contain nudity.
However, Ferber, Osborne, and Free Speech Coalition all premise their 
holdings on whether the images in question are harmful to minors.  Due 
to this necessary causal link, it is possible to extend Salter’s holding to 
other child pornography statutes, particularly in sexting cases.238  However,
even though Salter was decided after Williams, it remains unclear
whether courts will accept uncertainty challenges like the one accepted 
by the Salter court. 
234. Id.
235. Id. at 221 (citing Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Ind. 2007)). 
236. Id. at 223. 
237. Id. (footnote omitted).
238. One commentator has argued that “contributing to the delinquency of a minor” 
statutes are similarly vague when applied to sexting teens.  Julie Hilden, Why Sexting Should 
Not Be Prosecuted as “Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor,” FINDLAW (May 13, 
2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20090513.html. 
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b.  Discriminatory Enforcement 
The second part of the void for vagueness doctrine is discriminatory 
enforcement.  “A conviction fails to comport with due process if the
statute . . . is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory enforcement.”239  Discriminatory enforcement can be found 
when a statute “necessarily ‘entrust[s] lawmaking to the moment-to-
moment judgment of the policeman on his beat’” instead of to the 
legislature.240  There have not been any discriminatory enforcement claims
brought in sexting cases.  However, discriminatory enforcement has
caused one court to invalidate a statutory rape law as applied to two 
minors.241  The Vermont Supreme Court took issue with the fact that the
prosecutor’s office would prosecute cases of statutory rape only when it
believed that there was also lack of consent or evidence of coercion.242 
However, because those two additional elements are more difficult to 
prove, the juvenile would be charged with statutory rape because it is a
strict liability crime.243  This inconsistent prosecution was found to be
discriminatory enforcement of Vermont’s statutory rape law.244 
Inconsistent prosecutions are rampant in sexting cases.  Although all 
child pornography laws have harsh jail sentences, most sexting teens do 
not receive those sentences, and some may not be penalized at all.  States 
often charge sexting teens with lesser offenses such as distributing 
obscene material to a minor245 or contributing to the delinquency of a
minor.246 In other instances, the teens have been required to go to
counseling to escape criminal prosecution.247  For example, in Seattle, a
prosecutor allowed three teens to apologize to the victim, attend a
counseling program, and work with their school to create an awareness 
program about sexting instead of going to jail and registering as sex
239. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).  Discriminatory enforcement 
is also a concern for regulations on speech.  See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 
1030, 1051 (1991). 
240. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566, 575 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re G.T., 758 A.2d 
301, 306 (Vt. 2000) (“It is one thing to give discretion in enforcing a legislatively 
defined crime; it is quite another to give to prosecutors the power to define the crime.”). 
241. G.T., 758 A.2d at 309. 
242. Id. at 306. 
243. Id.
244. Id. (“Thus, the prosecutor determines what crime the juvenile has committed,
but charges in such a way as to ensure that the juvenile never has the opportunity to 
show that he or she did not commit the crime found by the prosecutor.”). 
245. More Sexting Charges Highlight Problem Among Teens, supra note 67. 
 246. Buckner, supra note 24; Curran, supra note 64; Ellis, supra note 6; Morse, 
supra note 69. 
 247. Shafron-Perez, supra note 2, at 440. 
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offenders.248  In Ohio, a judge required sexting teens “to do community 
service and to ask peers if they knew sexting was a crime.”249  In  
Pennsylvania, three sexting girls were at first cited with disorderly
conduct but later “sent to the county probation office’s Youth Aid Panel, 
which devises community service programs for juvenile offenders.”250 
In still other states, prosecutors and police have expressed confusion as 
to how to handle the matter.251  Others have not been so lucky. For
forwarding pictures of his ex-girlfriend to her e-mail contact list, Phillip 
Alpert became a registered sex offender at the age of eighteen.252  Isaac 
Owusu was sentenced to up to two years in prison and will serve ninety 
days for convincing two teenage girls to send him sexually explicit
photographs of themselves.253 
Different results can even happen within the same prosecutor’s office. 
In one case, the prosecutor investigated about twenty instances of teens’
having inappropriate images on their cell phones but arrested and 
charged only one girl.254  Another district attorney stated that she would 
have charged teens with child pornography if there had been a repeat 
pattern or cyberbullying, but instead she charged them with the
misdemeanor offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.255 
Another teen was not charged because “she was reluctant to have [her] 
picture taken” and therefore seemed more like a victim to prosecutors.256 
The enormous range of punishments between what a teen could
receive—decades in prison and registering as a sex offender—and the
punishment many actually do—counseling or juvenile probation— 
highlights the inconsistency between what teens are technically doing
(child pornography) and the perceived innocence of their actions.257 The 
248. Teens Avoid Detention in Sexting Case, supra note 65. 
 249. Koch, supra note 59. 
 250. Courogen et al., supra note 65. 
 251. Simmons, supra note 59. 
 252. Richards & Calvert, supra note 48, at 6. 
 253. Curran, supra note 64. 
 254. Russ Zimmer, Hottinger: Law Didn’t Anticipate Cell Phone Photo Case, 
NEWARK ADVOC., Oct. 8, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 27354928.  There is 
evidence that the prosecutor singled the girl out because she was caught with the image 
after he gave a speech against sexting at her school.  Kimpel, supra note 16, at 336 n.198. 
 255. Morse, supra note 69. 
256. Id.
257. See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010).  Miller presents an 
excellent example of the disparity in punishment.  The teens in that case were required 
by the district attorney to either go to a counseling program, which would result in no 
charges or criminal record, or face felony charges.  Id. 
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inconsistency of these prosecutions looks very similar to the 
inconsistencies that existed in statutory rape prosecutions before the 
enactment of Romeo and Juliet exceptions.  As with statutory rape 
prosecutions, these inconsistencies have resulted from some prosecutors’ 
attempts to make the application of child pornography laws to sexting 
teens fairer.
Statutes that directly address sexting may do something to even out 
prosecutions, but existing sexting statutes also address the problems
inconsistently.  Until a consensus is reached regarding if and how 
sexting teens should be punished, inconsistent prosecutions will be open 
to constitutional challenges.  The Supreme Court has yet to receive a
writ of certiorari on this issue, and the only circuit court case involving 
sexting did not address a direct constitutional challenge to the application of
child pornography laws.  Accordingly, the issue is still very much
undecided, and it would behoove state legislatures to address their child 
pornography laws’ constitutional infirmities before the Supreme Court
addresses the issue. 
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION—ROMEO AND JULIET PLUS
CYBERBULLYING 
Instead of waiting for a successful constitutional challenge, legislatures
would be wise to craft sexting statutes now.  Although some of these 
issues could be resolved with reduced sentencing, the possibility of being
required to register as a sex offender makes the creation of a separate 
criminal offense a more appropriate solution.  A Romeo and Juliet
exception that matches the state’s statutory rape laws would go a long
way to removing the discrepancies inherent in a multiple age of consent
system.  Most importantly, an identical Romeo and Juliet exception would 
match illegal sexual activity to illegal photographing activity.  Such an 
exception would not prevent prosecutors from pursuing traditional child 
pornographers because those defendants would be adults and the age of 
consent for those cases could remain eighteen. 
However, a Romeo and Juliet exception alone would not remove the 
harm that nonconsensual transmission of photos causes.  For that reason,
states should either include a consent element into their statutes or create 
or tailor an existing cyberbullying statute.258  A cyberbullying statute 
should capture teenagers’ harassing and bullying behavior both on and 
258. States could also add additional penalties for transmission or creation of images
for commercial gain to discourage situations where teens contract with unscrupulous adults to 
create sexually explicit images.  See Leary, supra note 2, at 4–5 (listing examples of 
juvenile self-pornography and prostitution); Weins & Hiestand, supra note 4, at 51–52 
(regarding model language). 
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off school grounds if this behavior interferes with the victim’s ability to 
perform in school.  The penalties for such cyberbullying could be
punishment through the school or even minor criminal penalties such as 
the ones being used in current sexting statutes.  By adding these two
elements to sexting or child pornography legislation, legislatures would
be addressing the actual harms inherent in sexting while leaving teens
free to pursue their consensual sexual expression. 
VI. CONCLUSION
A bare reading of child pornography statutes and the reasons behind 
them, as articulated by the Supreme Court and those statutes themselves,
clearly show that these statutes were not meant to apply to teenage peers
sharing images of themselves with each other.  Child pornography 
statutes have not kept up with technology or the trend of teenagers who 
actively share very personal information.  Because prosecutors wish to
discourage this behavior, they threaten teens with statutes that can technically
apply to them, but in so doing, these statutes lose the protective rationale 
articulated by the Supreme Court. 
Statutory rape laws and Romeo and Juliet exceptions further complicate 
the issue.  Teens are now being prosecuted for having and sharing 
images of sexual activities in which they are legally allowed to participate.
The resulting mismatch between the permission given to teens to engage 
in sex but not photograph it has led to outcries of unfairness, changes in 
legislation, and constitutional challenges.  Although there have been no 
freedom of expression claims and most other constitutional law claims
have failed, the increasing number of sexting prosecutions is likely to 
lead to an upswing of constitutional challenges.  The fact that some teens 
are now fighting back—usually through their parents—instead of taking 
plea agreements increases this likelihood even further.  The application
of child pornography laws to sexting teens is vulnerable to several
constitutional challenges, particularly through freedom of expression and 
discriminatory enforcement.  Given enough time, courts may come to 
find that this mismatch of ages of consent cannot constitutionally stand.
State legislators should be aware of this potential future and alter their 
laws accordingly.  The creation of a matching Romeo and Juliet exception
and cyberbullying statutes would be a good start.
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